Friday, October 28, 2011

Dusman on Circularity on Dusman Part II (Logic)


This is part two of my response to Dusman on his post about circularity and logic. I covered the circularity issue in a previous post and now will discuss his position on logic and knowledge.

In the second part of Dusmans’ post, he argues that logic and knowledge must be “grounded in God”. His basis for this seems to be two main points; that logic is “immaterial” and that logic has a “moral component”.  On the first point of the “immaterial” Dusman gives us two syllogisms.

“That logic is immaterial is demonstrated via the following syllogisms:
1. Material things are extended in space.
2. Our concepts of "logic" are not extended in space.
3. Therefore, our concepts of "logic" are non-material.
4. Some versions of materialism posit that no non-material entities exist.
5. Therefore, assuming some versions of materialism, concepts of "logic" do not exist.

Syllogism two:

1. Concepts are immaterial.
2. But some versions of materialism hold that anything that exists is material.
3. Our concepts are not material things.
4. Therefore, concepts do not exist.
5. Our concepts of "logic" are immaterial.
6. Therefore, in some versions of materialism, "logic" does not exist.”

Unfortunately for Dusman he shows his lack of understanding of naturalism in both syllogisms by equating naturalism to some form of reductionism/materialism. In the naturalist world view, not everything that exists need be extended in space or reducible to “matter” so his conclusions fail. We also do not posit an immaterial abstract realm as he seems to suggest in his following statement.

“The immaterial Christian God grounds immaterial logic as God is rational and orderly by nature and originally imputed said order to His created order, especially for those created in His image.  Positing an immaterial abstract realm like Plato's realm of ideals contradicts naturalism as it appeals to "other-worldly" explanations which are disdained in most modern naturalistic philosophizing, doesn't tell us how the immaterial realm of the forms informs the physical world, nor is an abstract, impersonal immaterial realm able to ground the personal moral obligation to be logical.  Arguments to the contrary have been demonstrated to be unsuccessful. “

Notice how Dusman starts with assuming his intended conclusion through non-sequitur by claiming since logic is “immaterial” and God is “immaterial” that God is therefore grounds for logic. Even if we grant Dusman both that logic and God are “immaterial” it does not follow that God is the grounds for logic.
Dusman gives us a link to another of his blog posts to try to support his position more. I do not intent to review the entirety of his other post as I think most of it is already covered in this one, however there are a couple items that stand out that I think should be addressed.

Dusman says: “Of course, our materialist detractors have said, "but concepts are material and can be reduced to electrochemical reactions in the brain" and so syllogism 1 is false. But this shows the ignorance of our materialist friends on so many levels”

It looks as though Dusman is doing nothing more than trying to appeal to the ignorance of his Christian audience since I know of no materialist that would say concepts are reducible to electrochemical reactions in the brain. 

Of his other points refuting the straw man that he has created Dusman does say something I find very interesting.

“This position generates an interesting dilemma: If logic is an emergent property, then there were no truths before logic emerged and contradictions could be actualized. So, assuming an evolutionary timescale, what are we to make of claims about the distant past by cosmology and paleontology before physical human brains existed? How can they be true now unless they were also true then?”

The key thing I noticed here is where Dusman says; “If logic is an emergent property, then there were no truths before logic emerged and contradictions could be actualized”. This is interesting because he now suggesting that if there were no logic that “contradictions could be actualized”.  Dusman has now taken the position that objective reality or rather what exists is dependent on logic. This is obviously absurd since even if we grant the immaterial nature of logic as being a process of an immaterial mind then in Dusmans world view no minds or logic can exists because their existence would be dependent on the logic of other minds adinfinitum.

Moving on, Dusman tries to show us how logic has a “moral component”.

“Second, logic has a moral component; i.e., we are obligated to be rational and logical.  Appeals to survival value via natural selection, appeals to logic as an emergent property of the material brain, or social contract theory are irrelevant as they tell us what is the case not necessarily what should be the case.  To ground universal personal moral obligation, you need such obligation grounded in a personal transcendent, universal source.  Such grounding is satisfied in the Triune God.  Thus, unless you begin with this God in all of your reasoning, you can't account for your reasoning processes because those very processes require resources that can only exist, be grounded, and normative if the immaterial God of Scripture exists.”

While Dusman claims “we are obligated to be rational and logical” he does not give us a reason why this is the case. To who are we obligated? I also think he misses a major fact that in many cases humans are neither rational nor logical and it could even be argued that we more often than not act in an irrational way. What he is trying to get at here is that naturalism cannot say why one “should” be rational and logical. Of course this is flatly wrong, as naturalism would simply say that if one wants to better understand the world (what actually exists) then one should be rational and logical. A “should” without a reason is meaningless.

Dusman now moves on the topic of knowledge and provides us with a lengthy quote from a Dr. James Anderson. I will only provide the link to Dr. Anderson’s paper as to not clutter this post any more than already is the case. [http://www.proginosko.com/docs/knowledge_and_theism.html]

Dusman continues on and quotes himself with:

 “Knowledge is justified true belief or warrant. Naturalism must appeal to one's senses and reasoning to verify one's senses and reasoning. This is a classic version of question begging and it can only be escaped by appealing to an all-knowing, personal, a priori source. Hence, God.”

And then in follow up to my request for clarification he continues:

“I mean that to confirm or assume that they are functioning properly you have to use them to confirm and assume them.  This is a classic example of begging the question because you're assuming the very thing you're trying to prove in order to prove it without going outside of the same plane of reasoning to prove it.  Thus, this doesn't meet the classic definition of knowledge normally defined by philosophers as justified, true, belief.  In order to escape this vicious circularity and have knowledge that your senses are valid without appealing to irrationality to do it, you must appeal to an all-knowing Source that exists outside of your senses that can confirm the general reliability of your senses (Proverbs 20:12).  For more information see my article Sensation, Reason, and Christian Epistemology.

Why he wants to lump “senses” and “reasoning” together here as if they are the same or even similar is beyond me however its clear Dusman has an issue with the use of reasoning to “justify” reasoning. This is quite funny as justify in this context essentially means to give good reason for something. It seems quite odd to ask for a good reason for reason.  Dusman also seems to think the question of what is knowledge is settled and has taken it upon himself to declare it as “justified true belief” (JTB). If he is going to take this position, he needs to show us how (JTB) is any better than mere true belief. Not only does he need to show how justification adds any value to true belief but he also needs to account for scenarios where one has (JTB) that would not be considered knowledge.

In conclusion, Dusman not only shows a lack of understanding of naturalism by giving us straw-man arguments for some reductionist version of materialism but also shows a clear misunderstanding of what logic is and offers us only what his thinks it is not.



32 comments:

  1. http://graceinthetriad.blogspot.com/2011/10/does-god-ground-logic.html

    ReplyDelete
  2. Dusman,

    Your article is just a rehash of what I already addressed. You seem to have a fundamental misunderstanding of what logic is. You keep referring to logic as some sort of “entity” and this is just flat wrong. Logic is a method of reasoning which is a process of minds. Methods and processes of minds do not have extension in space. This is not an issue for naturalism. Laws of logic (aka laws of thought) are just how one should think in order to be logical. I think you just want to try to create a problem where there is none and then say you have a solution.

    ReplyDelete
  3. JC, Dustin is hugely out of his depth, but his living depends upon maintaining an illusion of being 'right', which is why he writes garbage so regularly

    ReplyDelete
  4. JC,

    Secular metaphysicians since the time of Plato have called the laws of logic, concepts, and numbers abstractions, "entities", etc., so I'm not sure how I have a fundamental misunderstanding of what logical laws are on metaphysical grounds when I'm using the same language and concepts they have.

    If logic is merely an emergent property of minds, then logic didn't exist before minds existed, and absurdity would have been a characteristic part of reality. Thus, the universe could have existed and not existed at the same time and in the same way.

    The basic laws of logic are conceptual by nature and absolute. Being absolute they transcend space and time. They are not the properties of the physical universe (since they are conceptual) or of people (since people contradict each other, which would mean they weren't absolute). So, how do naturalists account for them?

    Examples of logical absolutes are: something cannot be itself and not itself at the same time (Law of non contradiction). A thing is what it is (Law of identity). A statement is either true or false (Law of excluded middle). These are simple, absolute logical absolutes.

    How can absolute, conceptual, abstract laws be derived from a universe of matter, energy and motion even if they are emergent properties of mind? In other words, how can a naturalist with a naturalistic presupposition account for the existence of logical absolutes when logical absolutes are conceptual by nature and not physical, energy, or motion?

    ReplyDelete
  5. Dusman,
    Logic itself is not a concept. Logic is a *method* by which a mind reasons. Here is the definition from dictionary.com for you.

    1. the science that investigates the principles governing correct or reliable inference.
    2. a particular method of reasoning or argumentation: We were unable to follow his logic.
    3. the system or principles of reasoning applicable to any branch of knowledge or study.
    4. reason or sound judgment, as in utterances or actions: There wasn't much logic in her move.
    5. convincing forcefulness; inexorable truth or persuasiveness: the irresistible logic of the facts.

    You said: “If logic is merely an emergent property of minds, then logic didn't exist before minds existed, and absurdity would have been a characteristic part of reality. Thus, the universe could have existed and not existed at the same time and in the same way. “

    Can you see how absurd what you are suggesting is? You think reality is dependent on logic? Logic does NOT dictate reality; Period.

    “The basic laws of logic are conceptual by nature and absolute. Being absolute they transcend space and time. They are not the properties of the physical universe (since they are conceptual) or of people (since people contradict each other, which would mean they weren't absolute). So, how do naturalists account for them?”

    Laws of logic are merely the rules by which thoughts (propositions, beliefs, etc.) should be to be logical. There is no special need to “account” for them.

    “Examples of logical absolutes are: something cannot be itself and not itself at the same time (Law of non contradiction). A thing is what it is (Law of identity). A statement is either true or false (Law of excluded middle). These are simple, absolute logical absolutes.”

    You just gave us the three classical laws of thought. As I already stated they apply to thoughts. It doesn’t matter if you attach the word “absolute” to them, they are still the same.


    “How can absolute, conceptual, abstract laws be derived from a universe of matter, energy and motion even if they are emergent properties of mind? In other words, how can a naturalist with a naturalistic presupposition account for the existence of logical absolutes when logical absolutes are conceptual by nature and not physical, energy, or motion?”

    Lots of things in a naturalist world view are not *reducible* to “physical, energy, or motion”. Minds or consciousness would be one such thing. Laws of thought apply to minds and are therefore also not reducible to matter. Again, your issue is with some form of extreme reductionist materialism and not with my naturalism.

    I would be happy to discuss these kind of things further with you on one of the skype podcasts or something if you are interested.
    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  6. If logic is merely an emergent property of minds, then logic didn't exist before minds existed, and absurdity would have been a characteristic part of reality. Thus, the universe could have existed and not existed at the same time and in the same way.
    Logic is a set of tools by which minds that are developed enough can use to examine reality around them. That's probably what they're trying to tell you. How can you possibly think that logic can effect reality around it?

    It can describe it, and maybe explain it, but affect it? Get real.

    The basic laws of logic are conceptual by nature and absolute. Being absolute they transcend space and time. They are not the properties of the physical universe (since they are conceptual) or of people (since people contradict each other, which would mean they weren't absolute).
    Even if so, so what? Your own bible contradicts itself. Please, no talk about "typographical errors" or somesuch thing. Inerrant means inerrant. If your god can't keep his scribes from screwing up in simple mathematical notation for instance, how can certain apologists use him as the justification for reasoning, knowledge, etc?

    So, how do naturalists account for them?
    They're a function of higher thought where we are able to observe and deduce how the universe works, and work out (that means figure out) what the laws of logic are.

    Seriously, are you trying to say in some long round about way, that since things like ideas, emotions, etc don't have physical forms themselves that "naturalists" don't have any justification for them? (Therefore, you want to lead us to: Why not room for one more metaphysical idea: God)?

    Emotions are a product of our physical brains, as is being able to derive the roots of logic. Any person with brain damage or brain-degenerative disease will have problems with both. That should tell you something.

    ReplyDelete
  7. JC,

    Logic isn't a concept?

    Here's part of the def. for 'thing' in the OCP:

    "'Thing,' in its most general sense, is interchangeable with 'entity' or 'being' and is applicable to any item whose existence is acknowledged by a system of ontology, whether that be particular, abstract, or concrete. In this sense, not only are material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted 'things'" (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, 1995), 871).

    Lastly, you claimed logic was in minds. Since some logical truths appear to be necessary truths, then they exist in all possible worlds and, per your def., they exist in a mind, then there must be minds in all possible worlds. This makes God's mind the most plausible candidate.

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Dusman,

    Logic is a *method*.


    “Lastly, you claimed logic was in minds. Since some logical truths appear to be necessary truths, then they exist in all possible worlds and, per your def., they exist in a mind, then there must be minds in all possible worlds. This makes God's mind the most plausible candidate.”

    I did not claim logic was in minds. I claimed “Logic is a *method* by which a mind reasons”.

    By “logical truths” I assume you mean the laws of thought(LOT). I would agree that (LOT) would exist in all possible worlds [where there are rational minds] however, it does not follow that there must be minds in all possible worlds. Your argument is fallacious.

    ReplyDelete
  9. What JC should say is that "logic" can be used to describe a method, but that is not the sense in which it is being used in these types of discussions.

    JC's comment that LT only exist where there are rational minds is false in that there are possible worlds in which rational minds do not exist. Or, in any instance where there are no rational minds, there are likewise no LT, and hence it may be the case that rational minds both exist and do not exist, or that 1+1=3 and 5, etc., which is absurd. But I doubt that someone who thinks modus tollens is logical but not necessarily valid is suited to talk about LT, rational minds, and possible worlds.

    ReplyDelete
  10. “What JC should say is that "logic" can be used to describe a method, but that is not the sense in which it is being used in these types of discussions.”

    Logic is a *method*.


    “JC's comment that LT only exist where there are rational minds is false in that there are possible worlds in which rational minds do not exist. Or, in any instance where there are no rational minds, there are likewise no LT, and hence it may be the case that rational minds both exist and do not exist, or that 1+1=3 and 5, etc., which is absurd. “

    You suffer from the same problem Dusman does in that you claim that LT controls reality. It’s obviously absurd to think that laws of thought dictate what reality is.

    “But I doubt that someone who thinks modus tollens is logical but not necessarily valid is suited to talk about LT, rational minds, and possible worlds.”

    Just because modus tollens is logically sound does not mean its conclusion is true! You know exactly what I meant when I said “not valid”. It’s quite sad that you have to resort to such silly jabs.

    ReplyDelete
  11. PART 1

    Alex,

    Stop reading now, the below is long, and we know how you feel about that, right? "TL:DR."

    JC,

    Can you see how absurd what you are suggesting is? You think reality is dependent on logic? Logic does NOT dictate reality; Period.

    You state these things so matter-of-factly, as if reasonable and well-informed people do not disagree with your understanding of logic (apparently culled from dictionary dot com). What is your expertise in this subject that allows you to issue such authoritative-sounding pronouncements?

    For example, we might ask why do you think it is that there are no contradictions 'in' the world? That is, contradictions which obtain in an extra-linguistic reality? Following philosopher of logic and metaphysician Tuomas Tahko in his article "The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle" (Australian Journal of Logic (7), 2009, 32-47), we might want to define the law of non-contradiction thus:

    "We will, however, be better off with one of Aristotle’s many formulations of LNC, such as ‘the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect’ (Aristotle 1984: 1005b19-20). When put like this, the principle appears consid- erably deeper, as it clearly states a restriction that concerns things rather than just propositions. We can thus avoid a prolonged discussion about the nature of propositions. We might very well be able to extend the applicability of LNC beyond the ascriptions of properties to objects, but for the sake of simplicity we will only discuss this version here. The semantic or logical interpretation of LNC, which we aim to undermine, considers LNC to be a principle that governs our thoughts and perhaps our language, or even more weakly, simply a princi- ple which is true in certain models (i.e. logical systems) and has no bearing on (mind-independent) reality." (33)

    Tahko goes on to state,

    "At its simplest, the metaphysical interpretation of  amounts to this: the entities of the mind-independent reality are plausibly governed by some sort of principles (as otherwise there would be no order in our experience of them), that is, there are some constraints as to what kind of properties a certain kind of entity can and cannot have, and further, some of these properties are mutu- ally exclusive. For instance, a particle cannot both have and not have a charge at the same time, or an object cannot be both green and red all over at the same time. It seems that reality just is such that it conforms to the law of non- contradiction." (34)

    And so here is a recognized expert in the field who, though he has access to dictionary dot com, doesn't feel the rational force of those assertions as somehow demanding his assent. On your model, we might ask, why is it that reality, in a mind-independent and extra-linguistic sense, always and ever obeys the LNC? Does this "just happen" to work out? Is it not the case that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect? Is it just accidental that we cannot find examples of entities with mutually exclusive properties? If logic is simply "a *method* by which a mind reasons," then why is it that mind-independent reality always and everywhere obeys the law of non-contradiction? Furthermore, there does seem to be other constraints logic places on reality, or at least reality must conform to, such as Ax (Ex --> x=x); for every object x, if x exists then x is identical to itself.

    Cont.

    ReplyDelete
  12. PART 2

    Moreover, logic seems broader than your definition, even at the semantic or model level. Mathematicians and philosophers have long known that logic is the study of certain mathematical properties found in formal languages. On can't read, for example, Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic, and miss the tight connection between logic and math. There's debate here, e.g., between, say, Quineans and Fregeans, but it's not as obvious and "thus sayeth-ous" as you seem to imply. So, logic is much broader than you suggest. It studies the structure of formal languages, it studies validity and logical consequence, it studies logical truths, deducing propositions from the empty set, etc. Moreover, it tells us, as you hint at, how minds should or ought to reason. Thus there's a normative aspect to logic too.

    Of course, many people wonder just what sense can be given to norms on naturalism. It's a live debate amongst philosophers, which the majority admitting norms have no place within naturalism. So again, your rather cock-sure and austere pronouncements here seem very bold, to say the least. What are your credentials to make these claims?

    Anyway, back to logical truths. This gets us involved in theories of truth and what it means to say something is true. Alex Botten has assured us that to say "X is true" is to say that "X is in accord with the way the world is." So on this definition, logical truths are about the way the world is. So we'd appreciate it if you were just as hard on Botten as you are on the theists. In any case, what about modal logics? Why think these are methods simply of how humans minds should reason? They seem to be about notions like necessity, contingency, and possibility. If no logic exists apart from human minds, then logic is contingent on humans minds. But this itself is a modal claim, and it seems your committed to it. How would you make sense of this contingency claim without appealing to some reality notion of modality? And if you're going to admit realism about logic, then what's your beef with Dustin et alia?

    I dunno, the above was rather scattergun, but your claims don't strike me as at all familiar with the relevant positions in the debate and you seem to suffer from that vice of not knowing how much you don't know. I haven't presented anything like an argument for theism here, I'm just shooting in the bushes to see what comes out.

    ReplyDelete
  13. No JC, I did not claim that LT "controls" or "dictate" reality, and I have no idea where you would get that from what I actually wrote.

    Soundness does not apply to MT, it applies to arguments, and soundness as applies to arguments does mean (among other things) that the conclusion is true. When you said, "not valid" I took you to mean, "not valid." If you meant something else, then why did you write what you did? Now you have tried to explain yourself and I still don't know what you meant. This is not a "silly jab." You just don't know what you're talking about and it is making it difficult to understand what your objections even are.

    The problem with your view (note, *your* view) is that you render LT contingent upon rational minds. Now given that rational minds are themselves contingent, rather than necessary, so are LT in your view. Or to put it another way, prior to the existence of rational minds, contradictions were true. But that is absurd.

    ReplyDelete
  14. "If he is going to take this position, he needs to show us how (JTB) is any better than mere true belief. Not only does he need to show how justification adds any value to true belief but he also needs to account for scenarios where one has (JTB) that would not be considered knowledge."

    Well, 'J' has a broad useage in the literature. So it's not clear what counterexamples to JTB you have in mind. I agree that on more classical or deontological views, JTB has counterexamples, but there are counter-arguments even here, see, for instance, Vallicella or McGrew.

    In any event, this is beside the point. The point of the 'J' is to avoid ascribing the honorary title, 'knowledge,' to cases of luck or accident. Mere true belief does not rule out holding the true belief due to accident, lucky guess, etc. It doesn't seem prudent to claim that 'S knows that p' when S just took a wild guess at p.

    ReplyDelete
  15. Paul,

    Thank you for your comments. I may take your comments as motivation for a whole new post as it is a topic that could use more attention for sure. This will just count as a brief response and we can see where it goes.

    “You state these things so matter-of-factly, as if reasonable and well-informed people do not disagree with your understanding of logic (apparently culled from dictionary dot com). What is your expertise in this subject that allows you to issue such authoritative-sounding pronouncements?”

    I did state is as a matter of fact because that is what it is. I also did pull the definition of logic from a dictionary as that is a great place to reference an institutional fact of the definitions of words.

    “For example, we might ask why do you think it is that there are no contradictions 'in' the world? That is, contradictions which obtain in an extra-linguistic reality? Following philosopher of logic and metaphysician Tuomas Tahko in his article "The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle" (Australian Journal of Logic (7), 2009, 32-47), we might want to define the law of non-contradiction thus:”

    Surely you must see the difference between *logic* and *LNC*. They are NOT the same so to use them interchangeably will just cause confusion. It also appears that most of your comment is based on the confusion created.

    As for the idea of LNC as a metaphysical principle, I really don’t have any problems with that. I have not read the whole paper by Tahko yet but right from the start it seems quite agreeable with naturalism. From the abstract he makes it clear what he is advocating:

    “I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle”

    Tahko also makes it clear that the LNC is a general principle DERIVED from how things are in the world.


    “The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world”

    If LNC is indeed a metaphysical principle then I see no reason why it would not also apply to logic.

    “Moreover, logic seems broader than your definition, even at the semantic or model level. Mathematicians and philosophers have long known that logic is the study of certain mathematical properties found in formal languages. On can't read, for example, Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic, and miss the tight connection between logic and math. There's debate here, e.g., between, say, Quineans and Fregeans, but it's not as obvious and "thus sayeth-ous" as you seem to imply. So, logic is much broader than you suggest. It studies the structure of formal languages, it studies validity and logical consequence, it studies logical truths, deducing propositions from the empty set, etc. Moreover, it tells us, as you hint at, how minds should or ought to reason. Thus there's a normative aspect to logic too.”

    None of what you suggest seems to contradict my position that logic is a *method*. Again I think you are interchanging laws of thought with thought its self and this just doesn’t work. Of course laws of thought do tell us how we ought to reason [if we want to be logical]. I don’t think this makes it any different than laws of agriculture telling us when we ought to plant if we want food.

    ReplyDelete
  16. "I did state is as a matter of fact because that is what it is. I also did pull the definition of logic from a dictionary as that is a great place to reference an institutional fact of the definitions of words."

    Actually, it's not "the way it is," as any cursory reading of any introductory philosophy of logic text will teach you. Secondly, dictionary dot come is a *horrible* place to go when discussing a philosophical topic like this. We're not trying to get a historical report on how words have been used. This is probably why *no one* in the philosophy of logic appeals to a dictionary definition when defining the nature, scope, and subject matter of logic. Moreover, *no one* defines it the way you do. Dictionary dot com are not logicians.

    In any case, we can use logical methods, but logic ≠ 'a method.' In fact, i challenge you to find me *one* logician or philosopher of logic who claims that logic = a method, and that's that. If you admit that it is *more than* a method, why then you've been caught red-handed.

    "Surely you must see the difference between *logic* and *LNC*."

    Uh, yeah, thanks for the tutelage. Surely you can see this rejoinder misses the point of the argument?

    Tahko also makes it clear that the LNC is a general principle DERIVED from how things are in the world.

    So? You think this shows his view of logic, or this view of logic, is "consistent with naturalism." And why is that? You cite him saying "logic is derived from the way things are." But your claim would only follow (a) if the "way things are" is 'naturalism,' and (b) nothing "derived from" the way things are could be incompatible with naturalism! Surely you see your illogical inference and your unwarranted assumptions?

    ReplyDelete
  17. PART 2

    "None of what you suggest seems to contradict my position that logic is a *method*.

    Well, this is ambiguous:

    1. If you're claiming that logic is merely or only a method; then yes, what I did say contradicted it.

    2. If you admit logic is *more than* a method (in that there are logical methods), then your whole "point" is trivial and uninteresting.

    In any case, most logicians and philosophers of logic have been *realists* about logic. That is, logic seems to be *about* something. For example, the empty set is something logicians talk about. In a straightforward sense, they seem to think and talk and act as if the empty set exists (same with mathematical realism). But if so, and since it is necessary, acausal, and eternal, we want to know how our minds come into contact with it? Thus there's a realist story about truth or semantics too. Most philosophers of logic have thought that realism about ontology and realism about the truth of logical statements go hand in hand. Putting aside the debate over all of this, it's quire clear that logic deals with more than, and is more than, simply a "method." In fact, I gave several agreed upon understandings of what logic is, and they went beyond the idea that it is "a method."

    To what you think I'm doing, this just shows your ignorance of the field on which you're pontificating about. I put forward some pretty straightforward claims, and pretty much your only comment was to say there's a difference between "logic" and the "LNC."

    "Of course laws of thought do tell us how we ought to reason [if we want to be logical]. I don’t think this makes it any different than laws of agriculture telling us when we ought to plant if we want food."

    No one I know of views the norms of logic as hypothetical imperatives. Secondly, your claim is about practical rationality, not the normative status of logic. On this score, however, you show your ignorance again. First, many secular philosophers have pointed out that we don't really need logic at all to reason or be rational (e.g., Gilbert Harman). Second, not all reasoning is captured by either deductive or inductive logic. Now, I'm not a fan of Harman's thesis, but it does seem that you are simply out of your comfort zone here. In any case, since we all reason, it's not a question of whether we want to or not. Logic tells us how we should reason, then. We all reason, and logic prescribes how we ought to reason. This is clearly different from your analogy from agriculture. Indeed, "laws" of agriculture (if there are any) don't tell us what we "ought" to plant if we want food.

    But now I see I've had to go down numerous rabbit trails with you, and this is primarily due to your shooting from the hip on the subject rather than practicing epistemic virtues and studying before you pop off. I cannot spend my time teaching you and correcting silly notions and rejoinders that no one familiar with the relevant literature would say.

    ReplyDelete
  18. How about the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-log/#H6

    See the very first section called “The Organon” which is Greek for “tool”.

    “Ancient commentators [on Aristotle] regarded logic as a widely-applicable instrument or method for careful thinking.”

    Or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    “Informal logic is the attempt to develop a logic to assess, analyse and improve ordinary language (or "everyday") reasoning.”
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/

    “Aristotle approaches the study of logic not as an end in itself, but with a view to its role in human inquiry and explanation. Logic is a tool, he thinks, one making an important but incomplete contribution to science and dialectic”
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/

    I could go on and on but I think the point is made. A *tool* in this case is something you use just as you use a method. I believe they are quite interchangeable terms in this context.






    “So? You think this shows his view of logic, or this view of logic, is "consistent with naturalism." And why is that? You cite him saying "logic is derived from the way things are." But your claim would only follow (a) if the "way things are" is 'naturalism,' and (b) nothing "derived from" the way things are could be incompatible with naturalism! Surely you see your illogical inference and your unwarranted assumptions? “

    You seem to be unable to avoid confusing logic with LNC. Look at what you did.
    My original quote of Tahko: “The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world”
    To you somehow changing it to: “You cite him saying "logic is derived from the way things are."”

    I in NO WAY cited Tahko in the way you represented it!

    ReplyDelete
  19. To make my point clear:

    Logic is a *method* of reasoning.

    If there is no mind to reason then there is no logic.

    Laws of Thought like LNC are rules of how to reason logically.

    If there is no mind to reason then there are no laws of thought because there would be no thought.

    Now, LNC as a metaphysical principle does not require minds so even if there are no minds LNC as a metaphysical principle would still hold.

    ReplyDelete
  20. JC,

    I'm not sure if intentionally being obtuse, or not. Regarding your first post, I don't know how to say this more clearly, but I'll try: I NEVER DENIED THAT LOGIC IS **A** TOOL OR METHOD (more precisely, there are logical methods), BUT I HAVE DENIED THAT LOGIC IS MERELY OR ONLY A TOOL OR METHOD.

    None of the quotes you cited implied or stated that logic was merely or only a tool. Moreover, your SEP quote was an *informal* logic, not formal logic. More importantly, you're dealing more with what is known as *applied* logic, rather than the *philosophy* of logic. The latter is a *meta-level* inquiry that answers questions *about* logic (e.g., ontological, epistemological, alethic, etc., questions). Questions like these, for example, ask: e.g., do logical connectives and operators such as, '⋀', '⋁', '→, '¬', and '=' refer to anything in extra-linguistic reality. What, if anything, are logical objects? What, if anything, is logical objectivity? How, if we can, do we have knowledge of logical objects. Is logic foundational to math? What is the relation between logic and the world? Is logic necessary and known a priori. Etc. You're simply not even asking and answering the right questions. Thus, even though logic is a tool, that's not the end of it, as you seem to think. For a hammer is a tool, but it *exists* and has mind-independent reality.

    You are incapable of grasping basic points too. Rather than majoring on the minors, you should deal with the fact that if laws of logic or the LNC or whatever, is "derivable from the way things are," this is somehow "consistent with naturalism." That's clearly a non-sequitur, and *that's* the question you need to deal with, not semantical squabbles. I can assure you that I don't confuse logic with the LNC. First, I know more logic than you do. Second, I have read more in the philosophy of logic than you have. You simply look like a fool here, and the best you can do is play word games and turn unsubstantive claims into substantive ones.

    CONT . . .

    ReplyDelete
  21. PART 2

    "Logic is a *method* of reasoning."

    No, it's not a "method of reasoning." Even your quotes don't say this. It's not a method *of* reasoning, but a method or tool *for* reasoning properly. And that's not the whole story, as I've argued ad nauseum.

    "If there is no mind to reason then there is no logic."

    I assume you mean "human" mind. How do you account for the widespread belief in the necessity of logic? Moreover, you only get to this via your false premise, by saying logic = a method *of* reasoning. Then, by definition, if there are no *human* minds, there is no logic. However, I do agree in general with your claim, and since logic is necessary, and some logical principles are true in all possible worlds, then there must be a mind in all possible worlds. Above you claimed,

    By “logical truths” I assume you mean the laws of thought(LOT). I would agree that (LOT) would exist in all possible worlds [where there are rational minds] however, it does not follow that there must be minds in all possible worlds.

    Which shows your complete ignorance. You claim worlds without rational minds don't have logical truths. So, what would it mean to say that in a possible world without a mind that ¬¬(Ω ⋀ ¬Ω)?

    Moreover, you *admitted* above to a def. of the LNC that **doesn't make recourse to minds at all**!! You have trapped yourself. For there are possible worlds with no (natural or created minds) but with electrons. And in this world the LNC (which you claim is a law of thought), holds true, **per your own admission above**. Now, since you said there must be a rational mind in this world, and since the world contains exactly zero natural minds, then this world must have, **per your own admission**, a supernatural mind. Thus you refute yourself.

    It's stuff like this that tells me I'm wasting my time. Why don't you read before pontificating? It's not very nice or civil to waste other people's time like this, and force them to teach you without paying them.

    ReplyDelete
  22. We should also point out that it does not follow that if logic is a method for reasoning properly, then this method would not exist if there were no rational, human(oid) minds. That simply doesn't follow, logically. For even if there were no minds, it seems like conditionals like this would still be true: If there were rational minds, then they ought to reason this way, _____. And how do truths like that fit in a naturalist worldview? Secondly, one wonders what worlds without logical truths look like? For example, take this logical truth: ¬(A • ¬A). What does it mean to claim this isn't a truth in some possible world, W? Is the claim that the LNC *does not* hold in that world? Odd to apply the LNC to a world it doesn't hold in. In fact, I would argue that you cannot *conceive* of a world where the LNC doesn't exist. So, per Jay's position, minds exist in all possible worlds. What accounts for this better, theism or naturalism? The claim is already inherent in theism. Next, what of logic's relation to math? Do mathematical objects exist in all possible worlds? It would seem so, for example, nothing that is not self-identical exists. So, the number of things that exist in all possible worlds that are not self-identical is the empty set, {}. Thus, a least {} must exist in all possible worlds. But then we have one thing, namely, {}. By which we can build up as represented by, {{}}. But then we'd can get, {{}, {}}. But then, {{}, {}, {}}, ad infinitum. How do we build up numbers? Well, set theory is the foundation here. But we use logic in our set-theoretical arguments and constructions. If mathematical objects exist in all possible worlds, then so does logic.

    However, even assuming anti-realism about logic, as Jay does. It's not clear the only argument for God is from realism. For famous logician and anti-realist, Michael Dummet, has argued that anti-realism gets us to God.

    http://www.iep.utm.edu/dummett/#SH3e

    In any event, I'm not an anti-realist. I side with those like Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Frege, Russell, Godel, Kripke, Penrose, Shapiro, &co. regarding realism about these matters.

    ReplyDelete
  23. I'll keep going. Let's look at dictionary.com

    1. the science that investigates the principles governing correct or reliable inference.
    2. a particular method of reasoning or argumentation: We were unable to follow his logic.
    3. the system or principles of reasoning applicable to any branch of knowledge or study.
    4. reason or sound judgment, as in utterances or actions: There wasn't much logic in her move.
    5. convincing forcefulness; inexorable truth or persuasiveness: the irresistible logic of the facts.


    Notice that 'method' is #2. And here it's not referring to logic proper at all. No, it's referring to the euphemism, "I don't get his logic." It's referring to the particular way one person reasoned in some instance!

    Notice #1. Number one notes that there are "principles" that are "discovered" which "govern" reasoning. These "principles" could of course exist if there were no reasoners! For example, principles that govern sound "exist" even if there is no sound!

    Number 3 is obviously not what we're talking about. For we know that not all systems of study trade in deductive logic. On this view, we might say, "The logic of historical investigation," but we're using the term very broadly and loosly.

    I could keep going, but it's clear JC doesn't have a *clue* about what he's doing. He's shotting from the hip, googling everything, and then regurgitating what he find in his google search. So he foolishly goes to dictionary.com, and thinks that solves anything. Not only did it backfire, but it's about as stupid as me going to dictionary.com and typing in 'mind' and then refuting various materialist theories based on the definition of mind! He then types "logic" and "tool" into google and hunts and pecks until he finds the two words used in conjunction, and then pastes the sentenced in and puffs his chest out and thumps it. But we saw that none of them proved what he wanted them to prove. And, even if they did, so what? My point has been that there's *legitimate debate* about these matters and JC thinks there isn't any. He's even indicated that he's so cock sure because the way things are are the way things dictionary.com says they are.

    It's all rather sad. (I had to log in with wordpress since it appears JC banned my gmail account from commenting. I won't be back, but it is clear why he wouldn't want me to comment anymore. If you can't beat 'em, ban 'em.)

    ReplyDelete
  24. Paul,

    I am quite disappointed in your lack of respect for others. You started out so promising however you have resorted to childish name calling and false accusations for no apparent reason. I agree with you that there is *legitimate debate*. That is after all why we have these blogs and comment sections. In fact I think our view on logic have more overlap that you may want to admit, we just seem to have some different conclusions. I hope to do a full blog post on the topic in the near future and would look forward to any critique you may have.

    I am also quite baffled at your accusing me of banning your account. I have never banned any accounts from commenting on my blog. I even checked the spam section in blogger to see if your comment was there and it is not. I do not appreciate your baseless accusation and once again you show a lack of respect for others. I also did not know this was a competition. I do this because I enjoy the topic and find that honest debate can be quite enjoyable and sometimes we can even learn from each other. If you just see it as some sort of competition then you cut out any learning aspect of debate and personally I find that to be quite sad.

    I look forward to your apology for the false accusation.

    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  25. JC,

    No need for me to apologize when I said it *appears* you banned my gmail account. The reason it *appeared* this way is because after I tried posting 5 times with my gmail account, I read a notice that said, "This blog does not accept comments from this account," and it was the same account I had used before, the gmail one. So, that it appeared so to me can be true, honest, and not immoral, even if appearance doesn't match reality.

    Second, you may now *say* that there's legitimate debate, but above I wrote:

    ME: “You state these things so matter-of-factly, as if reasonable and well-informed people do not disagree with your understanding of logic (apparently culled from dictionary dot com).

    YOU: "I did state is as a matter of fact because that is what it is."

    Lastly, I respect you as a person, and I would help you if you were laying bleeding in a ditch on the side of the road. However, I cannot and do not respect the way you're arguing here and your unfamiliarity with the issues is so pronounced that I felt compelled to point this out. I do not believe that you are familiar with the relevant issues, and thus I believe it is and would be a waste of my time to continue here further. You may staunchly disagree, but you must know that I'm fine with that. Anyway, wrangle on.

    ReplyDelete
  26. Paul,

    I'm a little late to the party, but I'll throw in my 2c. You said:

    "Odd to apply the LNC to a world it doesn't hold in."

    I don't find it odd at all. It's easy to imagine a possible world W0 populated by zero minds. If we take statements and schemas and such to be inventions of minds, then the LNC would apply to W0 in the sense that here we are, in the actual world populated by minds and using a logical system where LNC holds to talk about W0. But since there are no minds in W0, then the LNC would not hold *inside* W0 because it would not exist in the first place.

    That seems to me a very compelling interpretation, since I don't know how to make sense of statements as anything other than products of intelligent minds.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Ben, first, I'm not sure it's easy to imagine a world populated by zero minds. But leave this alone. I also asked if we were saying that it was a truth *of that world* that the LNC does *not* hold *in* that world. Third, I admit I don't understand what it means to say that the LNC doesn't hold "in" that world, yet that there are definitely zero minds in it. Can it be true in the world that there are zero minds and one mind, in the same sense and at the same time? No. Why. Fourth, it seems much of this will depend on the relation of logic to math—which is still a live debate. Since you posited that the number of minds in that world is zero, then the set of minds in that world is {}, but then it seems there's one thing in that world, namely, {}. So we have {{}, {{}}} But if so, then, {{}, {{}}, {{{}}}}, etc. If logic is inseparable from set theory and math, then we have logic in that world. Fifth, I don't know what we make of the apparent *necessity* of the LNC on your view. Sixth, I think you can imagine a world called matterless world. And in this world, the LNC holds. If a world with no minds is possible, why not a matterless world? How is said world *impossible*. I can't see how it is. So, if LNC holds in matterless world and since, on your view, LNC requires minds, then we have a disembodied mind in this world. Sixth, I don't what sense to give possible worlds semantics once we jettison the LNC. Just what do you *mean* by a "possible world at which the LNC doesn't hold?" In what sense is it possible? Seventh, it seems you're committed to at least this one modal truth, namely, necessarily, the LNC is contingent on minds. This is true of *all* possible worlds. Thus it looks to me as if you're committed to some form of modal realism. Eighth, if there's *truths* about all worlds, I don't see how the LNC doesn't hold in all of them. So, it seems odd to me. I guess you're a logical anti-realist. Oh well, I don't find that view very plausible, but you;re free to hold it. In any event, Dummett argued from your proposition to God, so it's not as if there's a dead end if anti-realism is assumed.

    ReplyDelete
  28. Paul,

    Thanks for your response.

    I'm not sure how you want to characterize possible worlds, but let me propose a model, and see what you think. I'm sure you've heard of the characterization of possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions. Let's add a bit of a twist to that characterization, and say that a possible world W is the (hypothetical or real) state of affairs described by some maximally-consistent set S(W) of propositions. Maybe you prefer some other model of possible worlds, but let's go with this one for the moment, just so that I can illustrate my point.

    In this model we have two options: either we can permit members of S(W) to reference other propositions or not. If not, then for every proposition P there is no proposition in S(W) of the form "proposition P exists." If on the other hand we do permit members of S(W) to reference propositions, then we can construct S(W) by letting Q(P) = "proposition P does not exist" appear in S(W) for every P in S(W). In either case, every proposition in S(W) fails to exist within W.

    Notice that the LNC can still be "necessary" in the sense that it for every possible world W it is a member of S(W). But it will not exist "within" every W in the sense described above.

    Of course whatever model you construct, there will always be a difference between using statements to describe the model and representing statements within the model. That is the key difference I wish to emphasize.

    For similar reasons, I don't think it makes sense to say that because the set of minds in some world W is empty, therefore the empty set exists within W.

    Now, for a matterless world M, the LNC would only hold *within* M if there were minds existing within M. (Here I am assuming that statements are productions of minds, and that the LNC is a kind of statement.) So those minds would not have physical bodies, if indeed they had bodies at all, but I guess I don't see why this is a problem.

    As for modal realism, I don't know why you think that affirming a necessary modal truth commits me to it. But let me assure you I am not a modal realist.

    As for whether or not I'm a "logical anti-realist," I'm not exactly sure what kind of view you mean by that term. I affirm the existence of logical systems and statements and so forth in worlds populated by minds which produce them, so I'm not an anti-realist in the sense that I deny such existence.

    But anyway, hopefully my illustration of the model makes it seem less "odd" to you how the LNC can hold *of* a possible world but not *in* a possible world.

    --Ben

    ReplyDelete
  29. Ben, I will admit that the realism v. anti-realism debate is vexed, and I see no way through it. I have the intuition that realism is the case, but I could be wrong. To that end, I can certainly understand that the above statement does not seem odd *to you*. But JC did admit that the LNC, as a metaphysical principle, exists in all worlds, and so on that view, he's committed to a mind in all worlds. As you'd admit.

    In any case, I do not have the energy to engage in a sustained debate about realism, not least of all because I can't see that anti-realism is obviously false. I do have some worries about the matter, but these are so fine-grained as to not see profitable discussion in a combox.

    The realism I said you were committed to seemed to me to be that, according to the anti-realist view you've expressed, logical systems are contingent on human minds. That is, if there had been no human minds, there would have been no truths of logic. This seems to be your view. Now, It seems to me that an anti-realist of this sort must be committed to *at least* this one substantive contingency claim. If not, what *is* anti-realism, and what is it opposed to? But then how do you make sense of that substantive contingency claim itself on a anti-realist view? it seems can't, without appealing to some realist notion of modality not indexed to human systems of thought.

    I still say it looks odd to me, but that's because I'm a realist. I can say that I understand it doesn't look odd to *you*, though. Oh, by "anti-realist" I mean a view of logic that denies that objects or truths of logic have existence independent of human minds. I take you to be some kind of constructivist.

    ReplyDelete
  30. "But JC did admit that the LNC, as a metaphysical principle, exists in all worlds, and so on that view, he's committed to a mind in all worlds"


    As I stated before; LNC AS a metaphysical principle does NOT require minds so even if there are no minds LNC as a metaphysical principle would still hold.


    I don't see how you get from my statement that LNC as a metaphysical principle does NOT require minds to me being committed to a mind in all possible worlds. It appears that you are being dishonest in quoting my position.

    ReplyDelete
  31. Paul,

    Fair enough. But let me say one last thing, which is that even if it still seems odd to you that the LNC might not exist in some possible world, hopefully that odd feeling is no longer directly linked to the fact that here we are implicitly using the LNC to describe that world.

    --Ben

    ReplyDelete

Feel free to comment as much as you like. All views are welcome but don’t be surprised if others do not agree with you and comment back. Please keep it cordial.